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Abstract
In this paper, we deepen the analysis of continuous time Fictitious Play learning
algorithm to the consideration of various finite state Mean Field Game settings
(finite horizon, γ-discounted), allowing in particular for the introduction of an
additional common noise. We first present a theoretical convergence analysis of the
continuous time Fictitious Play process and prove that the induced exploitability
decreases at a rate O( 1t ). Such analysis emphasizes the use of exploitability as
a relevant metric for evaluating the convergence towards a Nash equilibrium in
the context of Mean Field Games. These theoretical contributions are supported
by numerical experiments provided in either model-based or model-free settings.
We provide hereby for the first time converging learning dynamics for Mean Field
Games in the presence of common noise.
1 Introduction
Learning in games has a long history [97, 94] but learning in the midst of a large number of agents still
remains intractable. Even the most recent successes of machine learning, including Reinforcement
Learning (RL) [106], remain limited to interactions with a handful of agents (e.g. Go [100, 102, 101],
Chess [27], Checkers [96, 95], Hex [13], Starcraft II [107], or poker games [23, 24, 85, 20]). Whilst
the general multi-agent learning case might seem out of reach, considering interactions within a
very large population of players may lead to tractable models. Inspired by the large economic
literature on games with a continuum of players [14], the notion of Mean Field Games (MFGs)
has been introduced in [81, 73] to model strategic interactions through the distribution of players’
states. In such framework, all players are identical, anonymous (i.e., they are not identifiable) and
have symmetric interests. In this asymptotic formulation, the learning problem can be reduced to
characterizing the optimal interactions between one representative agent and the full population.
Most of the MFG literature assumes the representative agent to be fully informed about the game
dynamics and the associated reward mechanisms. In such context, the Nash equilibrium for an
MFG is usually computed via the solution of a coupled system of dynamical equations. The
first equation models the forward dynamics of the population distribution, while the second is the
dynamic programming equation of the representative agent. Such approaches typically rely on partial
differential equations and require deterministic numerical approximations [9] (e.g., finite differences
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methods [4, 3], semi-Lagrangian schemes [32, 33], or primal-dual methods [22, 21]). Despite the
success of these schemes, an important pitfall for applications is their lack of scalability. In order to
tackle this limitation, stochastic methods based on approximations by neural network have recently
been introduced [37, 38, 55]. We now contribute and take a new step forward in this direction.
We investigate a generic and scalable simulation-based learning algorithm for the computation of
approximate Nash equilibria, building upon the Fictitious Play scheme [91, 56, 98].We study the
convergence of Fictitious Play for MFGs, using tools from the continuous learning time analysis [68,
87, 70]. We derive a convergence of the Fictitious Play process at a rate O( 1t ) in finite horizon or over
γ-discounted monotone MFG (see Appx. E), thus extending previous convergence results restricted
to simpler games [68]. Besides, our approach covers games where the players share a common source
of risk, which are widely studied in the MFG literature and crucial for applications. To the best of
our knowledge, we derive for the first time convergence properties of a learning algorithm for these
so-called MFGs with common noise (where a common source of randomness affects all players [34]).
Furthermore, our analysis emphasizes the role of exploitability as a relevant metric for characterizing
the convergence towards a Nash equilibrium, whereas most approximation schemes in the MFG
literature quantify the rate of convergence of the population empirical distribution. The contribution
of this paper is thus threefold: (1) we provide several theoretical results concerning the convergence
of continuous time Fictitious Play in MFGs matching the O( 1t ) rate existing in zero-sum two-player
normal form game, (2) we generalize the notion of exploitability to MFGs and we show that it is
a meaningful metric to evaluate the quality of a learned control in MFGs, and (3) we empirically
illustrate the performance of the resulting algorithm on several MFG settings, including examples
with common noise.
2 Background on Finite Horizon Mean Field Games
A Mean Field Game (MFG) is a temporally extended decision making problem involving an infinite
number of identical and anonymous players. It can be solved by focusing on the optimal policy of a
representative agent in response to the behavior of the entire population. Let X and A be finite sets
representing respectively the state and action spaces. The representative agent starts the game in state
x ∈ X according to an initial distribution µ0 over X . At each time step n, the representative agent
being in state xn takes an action an according to a policy pin(an|xn). As a result, the agent moves to
state xn+1 according to the transition probability p(.|xn, an) and receives a reward r(xn, an, µn),
where µn represents the distribution over states of the entire population at time n. For a given
sequence of policies pi = (pin)n and a given sequence of distributions µ = (µn)n, the representative
player will receive the cumulative sum of rewards defined as2:
J(µ0, pi, µ) = E
[
N∑
n=0
r(xn, an, µn) | x0 ∼ µ0, xn+1 = p(.|xn, an), an ∼ pin(.|xn)
]
.
Q-functions and value functions: TheQ-function is defined as the expected sum of rewards starting
from state x and doing action a at time n:
Qpi,µn (x, a) = E
[
N∑
k=n
r(xk, ak, µk) | xn = x, an = a, xk+1 = p(.|xk, ak), ak ∼ pik(.|xk)
]
.
By construction, it satisfies the recursive equation:
Qpi,µN (x, a) = r(x, a, µN ), Q
pi,µ
n−1(x, a) = r(x, a, µn−1)+
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a)Eb∼pin(.|x′) [Qpi,µn (x′, b)] .
The value function is the expected sum of rewards for the agent that starts from state x and can
thus be defined as: V pi,µn (x) = Ea∼pi(.|x) [Qpi,µn (x, a)]. Note that the objective function J of a
representative player rewrites in particular as an average at time 0 of the value function V under the
initial distribution µ0: J(µ0, pi, µ) = Ex∼µ0(.) [V
pi,µ
0 (x)] .
Distribution induced by a policy: The state distribution induced by pi is defined recursively by the
forward equation starting from µpi0 (x) = µ0(x) and µ
pi
n+1(x
′) =
∑
x,a∈X×A
pi(a|x)p(x′|x, a)µpin(x).
2All the theory can be easily extended in the case where the reward is also time dependent
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Exploitability: The exploitability φ(pi) of policy pi quantifies the average gain for a representative
player to replace its policy by a best response, while the entire population plays with policy pi:
φ(pi) := max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µpi)− J(µ0, pi, µpi).
Nash equilibrium: A Nash equilibrium is a policy satisfying φ(pi) = 0 while an approximate Nash
equilibrium has a small level of exploitability.
The exploitability is an already well known metrics within the computational game theory litera-
ture [110, 20, 80, 25], and one of the objectives of this paper is to emphasize its important role in the
context of MFGs. Classical ways of evaluating the performance of numerical methods in the MFG
literature typically relate to distances between distribution µ or value function V , as for example
in [9]. A close version of the exploitability has been used in this context (e.g., [64]), but being
computed over all possible starting states at any time. Such formulation gives too much importance to
each state, in particular those having a (possibly very) small probability of appearance. In comparison,
the exploitability provides a well balanced average metrics over the trajectories of the state process.
Monotone games: A game is said monotone if the reward has the following structure: r(x, a, µ) =
r˜(x, a) + r¯(x, µ) and ∀µ, µ′, ∑x∈X (µ(x)− µ′(x))(r¯(x, µ)− r¯(x, µ′)) ≤ 0. This so-called Lasry-
Lions monotonicity condition is classical to ensure the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium [81].
Learning in finite horizon problems: When the distribution µ of the population is given, the
representative player faces a classical finite horizon Markov Decision problem. Several approaches
can be used to solve this control problem. For instance, model-based algorithms (e.g. backward
induction: Algorithm 4 in Appx.) or model-free algorithms (e.g. Q-learning: Algorithm 2 in Appx.).
Computing the population distribution: Once a candidate policy is identified, one needs to be able
to compute (or estimate) the induced distribution of the population at each time step. It can either be
computed exactly using a model-based method such as Algorithm 5 in Appx. D, or alternatively be
estimated with a model-free method like Algorithm 3 in Appx. D.
Fictitious Play for MFGs: Consider available (1) a computation scheme for the population distribu-
tion given a policy, and (2) an approximation algorithm for an optimal policy of the representative
agent in response to a population distribution. Then, Fictitious Play presented in Algorithm 1 provides
a robust approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium by computing iteratively the best response
against the distribution induced by the average of the past best responses.
Algorithm 1: Fictitious Play in Mean Field Games
input :Start with a uniform policy pi0, define p¯i0 = pi0
1 for j = 1, . . . ,K: do
2 find pij a best response against µp¯ij−1 (either with Q-learning or with backward induction);
3 compute p¯ij the average of (pi0, . . . , pij);
4 compute the exploitability ej−1 = J(µ0, pij , µp¯ij−1)− J(µ0, p¯ij−1, µp¯ij−1);
5 compute µp¯ij (either with a model-free or model-based method).
6 return p¯iK
3 Continuous Time Fictitious Play in Mean Field Games
In Algorithm 1, the continuous time Fictitious Play process is defined following the lines of [68, 87].
First, we start for t < 1 with a fixed policy {pit<1n }n with induced distribution µt<1 = µpi
t<1
. Then,
the Fictitious Play process is defined for all t ≥ 1 as:
d
dt
µtn(x) =
1
t
(
µBR,tn (x)− µtn(x)
)
or in integral form: µtn(x) =
1
t
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x)ds ,
where µBR,tn denotes the distribution induced by a best response policy {piBR,tn }n against µtn(x).
Hence, the distribution µtn(x) identifies to the population distribution induced by the averaged policy
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{pitn}n defined as follows (proof in A):
∀n, µtn(x)
d
dt
pitn(a|x) =
1
t
µBR,tn (x)[pi
BR,t
n (a|x)− pitn(a|x)]
or in integral form: ∀n, pitn(a|x)
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x)ds =
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x)pi
BR,s
n (a|x)ds,
with piBR,sn being chosen arbitrarily for t ≤ 1. We are now in position to provide the main result of
the paper quantifying the convergence rate of the continuous Fictitious Play process.
Theorem 1. If the MFG satisfies the monotony assumption we can show that the exploitability is a
strong Lyapunov function of the system, ∀t ≥ 1: ddtφ(pit) ≤ − 1tφ(pit). Hence φ(pit) = O( 1t ).
The proof of the theorem is postponed to Appendix A. Furthermore, a similar property for γ
discounted MFGs is provided in Appendix C. Similarly to normal form games [75, 43], we conjecture
that the convergence rate of discrete time Fictitious Play for monotone MFGs is O(t−
1
2 ).
4 Experiments on Fictitious Play in the Finite Horizon Case
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical convergence of continuous time Fictitious Play by looking
at the discrete time implementation of the process. We first focus on classical linear quadratic games
which have been extensively studied [19, 60, 46] and for which a closed form solution is available.
We then turn to a more difficult numerical setting for experiments. In all experiments, we chose either
a full model-based implementation (Backward Induction with the exact evolution of the distribution)
or a full model-free approach (Q-learning with a sampled distribution).
4.1 Linear Quadratic Mean Field Game
Environment: We consider a Markov Decision Process a finite action space A = {−M, . . . ,M}
together with a one dimensional finite state space domain X = {−L, . . . , L}, which can be viewed
as a truncated and discretized version of R. The dynamics of a typical agent picking action an at
time n are governed by the following equation:
xn+1 = xn + (K(µ¯n − xn) + an)∆n + σn
√
∆n ,
allowing the representative agent to either stay still or move to the left or to the right. In order to make
the model more complex, an additional discrete noise n can also push the agent to the left or to the
right with a small probability: n ∼ N (0, 1), which is in practice discretized over {−3σ, . . . , 3σ}.
The resulting state xn+1 is rounded to the closest discrete state.
At each time step, the agent can move up to M nodes and it receives the reward:
r(xn, an, µn) = [−1
2
|an|2 + qan(µ¯n − xn)− κ
2
(µ¯n − xn)2]∆n
where µ¯n =
∑
x∈X xµn(x) is the first moment of the state distribution µn. ∆n is the time lapse
between two successive steps, while q and κ are given non-negative constants. The first term quantifies
the action cost, while the two last ones encourage the agent to remain close to the average state of
the population at any time. Hereby, the optimal policy pushes each agent in the direction of the
population average state. We set the terminal reward to r(xN , aN , µN ) = − cterm2 (µ¯N − xN )2.
Experimental setup: We consider a Linear Quadratic MFG with 100 states and an horizon N = 30,
which provides a closed-form solution for the continuous state and action version of the game (see
Appx. C) and bounds the number of actions M = 37 required in the implementation. In practice,
the variance σ of the idiosyncratic noise n is adapted to the number of states. Here, we set σ = 3,
∆n = 0.1, K = 1, q = 0.01, κ = 0.5 and cterm = 1. In all the experiments, we set the learning rate
α of Q-learning to 0.1 and the ε-greedy exploration parameter to 0.2.
Numerical results: Figure 1 illustrates the convergence of Fictitious Play model-based and model-
free algorithm in such context. The initial distribution, which is set to two separated bell-shaped
distributions, are both driven towards µ¯ and converge to a unique bell-shaped distribution as expected.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the distribution in the Linear Quadratic MFG with finite horizon.
The parameter σ of the idiosyncratic noise influences the variance of the final normal distribution.
We can observe that both Backward Induction and Q-learning provide policies that approximate
this behaviour, and that the exploitability decreases with a rate close to O(1/t) in the case of the
model-based approach, while the model-free decreases more slowly.
4.2 The Beach Bar Process
2
1
Bar
|X |-2
...
|X |-1
Figure 2: The beach bar process
As a second illustration, we now consider the beach bar process,
a more involved monotone second order MFG with discrete
state and action spaces, that does not offer a closed-form solu-
tion but can be analyzed intuitively.
Environment: The beach bar process (Figure 2) is a Markov
Decision Process with |X | states disposed on a one dimensional
torus (X = {0, . . . , |X | − 1}), which represents a beach. A
bar is located in one of the states. As the weather is very hot,
agents want to be as close as possible to the bar, while keeping
away from too crowded areas. Their dynamics is governed by
the following equation:
xn+1 = xn + b(xn, an) + n
where b is the drift, allowing the representative agent to either
stay still or move one node to the left or to the right. The
additional noise n can push the agent one node away to the
left or to the right with a small probability:
b(xn, an) =
{
1 if an = right
0 if an = still
−1 if an = left
n =
 1 with probability
1−p
2
0 with probability p
−1 with probability 1−p2
Therefore, the agent can go up to two nodes right or left and it receives, at each time step, the reward:
r(xn, an, µn) = r˜(xn)− |an||X | − log(µn(xn)) ,
where r˜(xn) denotes the distance to the bar, whereas the last term represents the aversion of the agent
for crowded areas in the spirit of [11].
Numerical results: We conduct an experiment with 100 states and an horizon N = 15. Starting
from a uniform distribution, we can observe in Figure 3 that both backward induction and Q-learning
algorithms converge quickly to a peaky distribution where the representative agent intends to be as
close as possible to the bar while moving away if the bar is already too crowded. The exploitability
offers a nice way to measure how close we are from the Nash equilibrium and shows as expected
that the model-based algorithm (backward induction) converges at a rate O(1/t) and faster than the
model-free algorithm (Q-learning).
5 Finite Horizon Mean Field Games with Common Noise
We now turn to the consideration of so-called MFG with common noise, that is including an additional
discrete and common source of randomness in the dynamics. Agents still sequentially take actions
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Figure 3: Beach bar process in finite horizon: (a, b) evolution of the distribution, (c) exploitability.
(a ∈ A) in a state space X , but the dynamics and the reward are affected by a common noise sequence
{ξn}0≤n≤N . We denote Ξn = {ξk}0≤k<n = Ξn−1.ξn−1 where |Ξn| represents the total length of
the sequence. The extra common source of randomness ξ affects both the reward r(x, a, µ, ξ) and
the probability transition function p(x′|x, a, ξ). We consider policies pin(a|x,Ξ) and population
distribution µn(x|Ξ) which are both noise-dependent, and will simply be denoted pin,Ξ(a|x) and
µn|Ξ(x). The Q function is defined as:
Qpi,µN (x, a|ΞN ) = r(x, a, µN |ΞN , ξN ), Qpi,µn−1(x, a|Ξn−1) =
∑
ξ
P (ξn−1 = ξ|Ξn−1)
[
r(x, a, µn−1,Ξn−1 , ξ) +
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a, ξ)Eb∼pin(.|x′,Ξn−1.ξ) [Qpi,µn (x′, b|Ξn−1.ξ)]
]
,
while the value function is simply V pi,µn (x,Ξn) = Ea∼pin,Ξn (.|x) [Q
pi,µ
n (x, a|Ξn)]. Similarly,
the distribution over states is conditioned on the sequence of noises and satisfies the balance
equation: µpi0 (x,Ξ0) = µ0(x) (with Ξ0 being the empty sequence {}) and µpin+1(x′|Ξ.ξ) =∑
x∈X
ppin,Ξ.ξ(x′|x, ξ)µpin(x|Ξ). The expected return for a representative player starting at µ0 is:
J(µ0, pi, µ) =
∑
x∈X
µ0(x)V
pi,µ
0 (x,Ξ0) =
N∑
n=0
∑
Ξ,ξ,|Ξ|=n
P (Ξ.ξ)
∑
x∈X
[µn(x,Ξ)r(x, a, µn,Ξ, ξ)]
with P (Ξ0) = 1 and P (Ξ.ξ) = P (ξ|Ξ)P (Ξ). Finally the exploitability is again defined as:
φ(pi) = max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µpi)− J(µ0, pi, µpi).
Continuous time Fictitious Play for MFGs with common noise: The Fictitious play process on
MFGs with common noise is as follows. For t < 1, we start with an arbitrary policy pit<1 (by
convention we will take pit = piBR,t for t < 1) whose distribution is µt<1 = µpi
t<1
(with the
convention that µt = µBR,t). Then, for all t and Ξ:
µtn(x|Ξ) =
1
t
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x|Ξ)ds,
where µBR,t is the distribution of a best response policy piBR,t against µt when t ≥ 1. The distribution
µt is the distribution of a policy pit, which is defined as follows for t ≥ 1:
∀n,Ξ, pitn(a|x,Ξ)
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x|Ξ)ds =
t∫
s=0
µBR,sn (x|Ξ)piBR,sn (a|x,Ξ)ds.
Theorem 2. Under the monotony assumption, the exploitability is a strong Lyapunov function of the
system for t ≥ 1: ddtφ(pit) ≤ − 1tφ(pit). Therefore, φ(pit) = O( 1t ).
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6 Experiments with Common Noise
6.1 Linear Quadratic Mean Field Game
Environment: We use a similar environment as the one described in the Linear Quadratic MFG.
Adding a common noise ξn to the idiosyncratic noise n, we now consider the following dynamics:
xn+1 = xn + (K(µ¯n − xn) + an)∆n + σ(ρξn +
√
1− ρ2n)
√
∆n .
The reward remains unchanged, except that the first moment of the state distribution µ¯n now depends
on the sequence of common noises Ξn: µ¯n = E[xn|Ξn]. We set ρ = 0.5.
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Figure 4: Linear Quadratic with Common Noise.
Numerical results: On Figure 4, the two separated bell-shaped distributions reassemble and follow
the sequence of common noises. Namely, the mean of the distribution moves with the successive
common noises, which are represented by the red line below the distribution’s evolution. This
evolution can be interpreted as a school of fish which undergoes a water flow (i.e. the sequence of
common noises). Both model-based and model-free approaches approximate the exact solution. The
exploitability of model-based still decreases at a rate O(1/t), while the one of model-free decreases
more slowly.
6.2 The Beach Bar Process
Environment: We consider a setting where the bar can close at only one given time step. This gives
two possible realizations of the common noise: (1) the bar stays open and (2) closes at this time step.
Here, the dynamics remain unchanged but the reward now depends on the common noise: ropen is
the same reward as before, whereas rclosed(xn, an, µn) = − |an||X | − log(µn(xn)).
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Figure 5: First Common Noise setting, the bar has a probability 0.5 of closing at time step 15.
Numerical results: In the experiments, the time step of closure is set at N2 where N is the horizon
of the game. We set the number of states to 100 and the horizon N to 30. We set the probability of
closure to 0.5. Figure 5 shows that agents anticipate the possibility that the bar may close: the density
of people next to the bar decreases before the time step of the common noise. After the common
7
noise, the distribution becomes uniform if the bar has closed or people go next to the bar again if
the bar stays open. Once again, the exploitability indicates that the model-based and model-free
approaches both converge to the Nash equilibrium and that the model-based converges faster.
7 Experiment at Scale
0
(a) start
50
(b) middle
500
(c) end
100 101 102 103 104
Iteration
102
103
Ex
pl
oi
ta
bi
lit
y
(d) Exploitability
Figure 6: 2D crowd modeling example.
We finally present a crowd modeling experiment, where a distribution of agents is encouraged to
move in a maze towards the center of a 100 × 100 grid. The reward at a state (i, j) is described
as r(s = (i, j), a, µ) = 10 ∗ (1− ‖(i,j)−(50,50)‖1100 )− 12 log(µ(x)), where the last term captures the
aversion for crowded areas. The initial distribution is chosen proportional to (1− ‖(i,j)−(5,5)‖2√
2×952 )
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while being null on the maze obstacles (the yellow strait lines). The evolution of the distribution as
well as the exploitability are represented in Figure 6 (a video is available in supplementary material).
8 Related Work
Theoretical results in MFGs: Theoretical results in terms of uniqueness, existence and stability of
Nash equilibrium in such games are numerous, see [28, 18, 34]. A key motivation is that the optimal
control derived in an MFG provides an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game with a large but
finite number of players. In general, most games are considered in a continuous setting while Gomes
et al. [59] proved existence results for finite state and action spaces MFGs and [92] considered finite
state discounted cost MFGs. An important and challenging extension is the case of players sharing
a common source of risk (such as several companies in the same economy market), giving rise to
the so-called MFG with common noise, see [35] or [34, Volume II]. These games are usually solved
by numerical methods for partial differential equations [9] or probabilistic methods [12, 38, 55].
Learning in games and MFGs: The scaling limitations of traditional multi-agent learning methods
with respect to the number of agents remain quite hard to overcome as the complexity of independent
learning methods [52, 90, 89, 103, 86, 54, 53] scales at least linearly with the number of agents and
some methods may scale exponentially (e.g. Nash Q-learning [71] or correlated Q-learning [62]).
By approximating the discrete population by a continuous one, the MFG scheme made learning
approaches more suitable and attracted a surge of interest. Model-based methods have been first
considered (e.g. [109] studied a MF oscillator game, [29] initiated the study of Fictitious Play in
MFGs). Recently, several works have focused on model-free methods such as Q-learning [64] but
the convergence results rely on very strong hypotheses. Note that, although our method can make use
of Q-learning to learn a best response, it does not rely on it. Also, our method can make use of both
model-based and model-free algorithms.
Fictitious Play (FP), which is also a classical method to learn in N -player games [91, 87, 68, 70, 69,
90], combined with a model-free algorithm has been considered in [84] but with several inaccuracies,
as already pointed out in [105], which focuses on policy gradient methods. However, they study a
restricted stationary setting as opposed to the finite time horizon covered by our contribution and
their convergence results hold under hardly verifiable assumptions.
Convergence of approximate FP has been proved in [51] (based on the FP analysis of [65, 66])
but without common noise and their analysis is for discrete time FP and only for first-order MFGs
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(without noise in the dynamics). Our analysis, done in continuous time, is more transparent and works
for MFGs with both idiosyncratic and common sources of randomness in the dynamics. Furthermore,
their numerical example was stationary whereas we were also able to learn the solution of time-
dependent MFGs, which covers a larger scope of meaningful applications. Finally, our analysis
provides a rate of convergence (O( 1t )) while previous FP work in MFG do not.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that Fictitious Play can serve as a basis for building practical algorithms
to solve a wide variety of MFGs including finite horizon and γ-discounted MFGs as well as games
perturbed by a common noise. We proved that, in all these settings, the resulting exploitability
decreases at a rate of O( 1t ) and that this metrics can be used to monitor the quality of the control
throughout the learning. To illustrate our findings and the versatility of the method, we instantiated
the Fictitious Play scheme using Backward Induction and Q-Learning to learn intermediate best
responses. Application of these instances on different MFGs have shown that the proposed algorithms
consistently learned a near-optimal control and led to the desired behaviour for the population of
players. This scheme has the potential to scale up dramatically by using advanced reinforcement
learning algorithms combined with neural networks for the computation of the best response.
9
Broader Impact
Applications of MFGs: The MFG model has inspired numerous applications [63] and we hope
our work can help practitioners to solve MFGs problems at scale. A popular application focuses
on population dynamics modeling [1, 31] including crowd motion modeling [7, 26, 45, 15, 8, 41],
opinion dynamics and consensus formation [104, 17, 88] or [72, 99] or sanitary vaccination [74, 48].
But MFGs have also naturally found applications in banking, finance and economics including
banking systemic risk [36, 49], high frequency trading [79, 30], income and wealth distribution [6],
economic contract design [50], economics in general [6, 2, 39, 57, 44] or price formation [81, 79, 58].
Energy management or production applications are studied in [10, 42, 47, 16, 76, 82, 63, 5, 40, 61],
whereas security and communication applications appear in [83, 93, 67, 108, 77, 78].
Exploitability as a metrics: One of the leading factor of progress for numerical or learning methods
is the clear understanding of which metrics should be optimized. In reinforcement learning, the mean
human normalized score is a standard metrics of success in RL. In supervised learning, the top 1
accuracy has been the foremost metrics of success. We hope the exploitability can achieve such a
role on the numerical aspects of MFGs.
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A Continuous Time Fictitious Play in Finite Horizon
In this section, we prove the Fictitious Play convergence result in the absence of common noise.
For the sake of clarity, we will write
rpi(x, µ) = Ea∼pi(.|x) [r(x, a, µ)] and ppi(x′|x) = Ea∼pi(.|x) [p(x′|x, a)]
for the rest of this section.
First, we prove the following property, which stems from monotonicity.
Property 1. Let f be a smooth enough function and let us assume that the ODE µ˙ = f(µ) (with
µ˙ = ddtµ) has a solution (µ
t)t≥0 = (µtn(x))t≥0,x∈X . If the game is monotone, then:∑
x∈X
< ∇µr¯(x, µ), µ˙ > µ˙(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. The monotonicity condition implies that, for all τ ≥ 0, we have:∑
x∈X
(µt(x)− µt+τ (x))(r¯(x, µt)− r¯(x, µt+τ )) ≤ 0.
Thus: ∑
x∈X
µt(x)− µt+τ (x)
τ
r¯(x, µt)− r¯(x, µt+τ )
τ
≤ 0.
The result follows when τ → 0.
Property 2. Let pˆit = (pˆitn)n=0,...,N be a sequence of time-dependent policies and let µpˆi
t
=
(µpˆi
t
n (x))n=0,...,N,x∈X be the sequence of their distributions over states. Let us denote, for all t, n, x,
µ¯tn(x) =
1
t
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n (x)ds. Then, the policy generating this average distribution is:
p¯itn(a|x) =
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n (x)pˆi
s
n(a|x)ds
t∫
0
µpˆisn (x)ds
. (1)
Note that
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n (x)ds can be chosen to be strictly positive as one can choose an arbitrary policy on
the time interval [0, 1] (for example, the uniform policy).
Or, more simply, one can write:
µ¯tn(x)p¯i
t
n(a|x) =
1
t
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n (x)pˆi
s
n(a|x)ds. (2)
Moreover, we have:
˙¯µtn(x)p¯i
t
n(a|x) + µ¯tn(x) ˙¯pitn(a|x) =
1
t
[
µpˆi
t
n (x)pˆi
t(a|x)− µ¯pˆitn (x)p¯itn(a|x)
]
.
Proof. Let us start with the following equality, which holds by definition of the dynamics:
µpˆi
s
n+1(x
′) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
p(x′|x, a)pˆisn(a|x)µpˆi
s
n (x).
Then, taking on both sides the average over the Fictitious Play time yields:
1
t
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n+1(x
′)ds =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
p(x′|x, a)1
t
t∫
0
pˆisn(a|x)µpˆi
s
n (x)ds.
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The left hand side is µ¯tn+1(x
′) by definition, and the time average in the right hand side can be written
as:
1
t
t∫
0
pˆisn(a|x)µpˆi
s
n (x)ds =
t∫
0
pˆisn(a|x)µpˆi
s
n (x)ds
t∫
0
µpˆisn (x)ds
1
t
t∫
0
µpˆi
s
n (x)ds = µ¯
pˆit
n (x)p¯i
t
n(a|x).
Combining the terms, we obtain:
µ¯tn+1(x
′) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
p(x′|x, a)µ¯pˆitn (x)p¯itn(a|x),
which proves that the policy p¯itn defined in (1) indeed generates µ¯
t
n. The other equalities in the
statement can be deduced from here readily.
Based on the above properties, we now proceed to the proof of the convergence of Fictitious Play
(Theorem 1) in the finite horizon case.
Proof of Theorem 1. To alleviate the notation, given a policy pi, we denote:
rpi(x, µ) =
∑
a
pi(a|x)r(x, a, µ).
We start by noting that, thanks to the structure of the reward coming from the monotonicity assump-
tion,
∇µrpiBR,tn (x, µtn) = ∇µr¯(x, µtn) and∇µrpin(x, µtn) = ∇µr¯(x, µtn). (3)
Moreover, from Property 2 with pi replaced by pˆiBR and µpˆi
t
replaced by µBR,t, we obtain (2).
Dropping the overlines to alleviate the presentation (so µt and pit denote respectively the average
sequence of distributions and the average sequence of policies), it implies:
µtn(x)
d
dt
pitn(a|x) =
1
t
µBR,tn (x)[pi
BR,t
n (a|x)− pitn(a|x)]. (4)
Moreover, recall that:
d
dt
µtn(x) =
1
t
[
µBR,tn (x)− µtn(x)
]
. (5)
From the above observations, we deduce successively:
d
dt
φ(pit) =
d
dt
[
max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µt)− J(µ0, pit, µt)
]
=
N∑
n=0
∑
x∈X
[
< ∇µrpiBRn (x, µtn),
d
dt
µtn > µ
BR,t
n (x)− < ∇µrpin(x, µtn),
d
dt
µtn > µ
t
n(x)
− < d
dt
pitn(.|x), r(x, ., µtn) > µtn(x)− rpin(x, µtn)
d
dt
µtn(x)
]
=
N∑
n=0
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µtn),
d
dt
µtn >
1
t
(
µBR,tn (x)− µtn(x)
)]
+
N∑
n=0
∑
x∈X
[
1
t
rpin(x, µtn)µ
t
n(x)−
1
t
rpi
BR,t
n (x, µtn)µ
BR,t
n (x)
]
= −1
t
φ(pit) +
N∑
n=0
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µtn),
d
dt
µtn >
d
dt
µtn(x)
]
,
where the third equality holds by (3), (4) and (5). Note that the product < ∇µr¯(x, µtn), ddtµtn > in
the last sum above is non-positive thanks to Property 1 (i.e., thanks to the monotonicity assumption).
Hence, the conclusion holds.
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B Continuous Time Fictitious Play in Finite Horizon with Common Noise
In this section, we prove the convergence result of continuous time Fictitious play in finite horizon
MFGs with common noise (Theorem 2). The reasoning is similar as in the finite horizon case without
common noise (App. A). The only difference comes from the conditioning with the common noise.
Proof of Theorem 2. For any policy, recall that we write pitn,Ξ(a|x) = pitn(a|x,Ξ).
We first note that, by the structure of the reward function, we have,
∇µrpi
BR,t
n,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ) = ∇µr¯(x, µtn|Ξ) and ∇µrpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ) = ∇µr¯(x, µtn|Ξ).
Moreover,
− < d
dt
pitn,Ξ.ξ(.|x), r(x, ., µtn|Ξ) > µtn|Ξ(x) = −
1
t
rpi
BR,t
n,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
BR,t
n|Ξ (x)+
1
t
rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
BR,t
n|Ξ (x)
and
−rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)
d
dt
µtn|Ξ(x) =
1
t
rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
t
n|Ξ(x)−
1
t
rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
BR,t
n (x)
Using the definition of exploitability together with the above remarks, we deduce:
d
dt
φ(pit) =
d
dt
[
max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µpi)− J(µ0, pi, µpi)
]
=
N∑
n=0
∑
Ξ,|Ξ|=n
∑
ξ
P (Ξ.ξ)
∑
x∈X
[
< ∇µrpiBRn,Ξ.ξ,ξ(x, µtn|Ξ),
d
dt
µtn|Ξ > µ
BR,t
n,Ξ.ξ(x)
− < ∇µrpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ, ξ),
d
dt
µtn|Ξ > µ
t
n|Ξ(x)
− < d
dt
pitn,Ξ.ξ(.|x), r(x, ., µtn|Ξ) > µtn|Ξ(x)− rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)
d
dt
µtn|Ξ(x)
]
=
N∑
n=0
∑
Ξ,|Ξ|=n
∑
ξ
P (Ξ.ξ)
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µtn|Ξ)),
d
dt
µtn|Ξ >
1
t
(
µBR,tn|Ξ (x)− µtn|Ξ(x)
) ]
+
N∑
n=0
∑
Ξ,|Ξ|=n
∑
ξ
P (Ξ.ξ)
∑
x∈X
[1
t
rpin,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
t
n|Ξ(x)−
1
t
rpi
BR,t
n,Ξ.ξ(x, µtn|Ξ)µ
BR,t
n|Ξ (x)
]
= −1
t
φ(pit) +
N∑
n=0
∑
Ξ,|Ξ|=n
∑
ξ
P (Ξ.ξ)
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µtn|Ξ),
d
dt
µtn|Ξ >
d
dt
µtn|Ξ(x)
]
,
where the last term is non-positive by Property 1 (i.e., thanks to the monotonicity assumption).
Experiments: A More Complex Setting for the Beach Bar Process with common noise
Environment: Following the first setting of the paper where the bar could only close at one given
time step, we now introduce a second more complex setting, bringing also of common noise in the
beach bar process. Namely, the bar has a probability p to close at every time step up to a point (in
practice, this point is half of the horizon: N2 ). Once the bar is closed, it does not open again. This
setting gives N2 + 1 possible realizations of the common noise: (1) the case where the bar never
closes and (2) the N2 cases where it closes at any of the first
N
2 time steps. For the sake of clarity, we
only present the evolution of the distributions when the bar finally remains open after N2 time steps,
and when it closes at the N2
th
time step.
Numerical results: As in the first setting, we take |X | = 100 states and N = 30 time steps. As
the bar has a probability p = 0.5 to close at every time step until N2 , the distribution is flatter to
anticipate the fact that people might need to spread. We can see that both model-based and model-free
approaches converge to a Nash equilibrium and that model-based converges faster than model-free.
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(a) Model-based, the bar stays open (b) Model-based, the bar closes
100 101 102
Log(iterations)
10 3
10 2
10 1
Backward Induction
Q-learning
(c) Exploitability
(d) Model-free, the bar stays open (e) Model-free, the bar closes
Figure 7: 2nd common noise setting, the bar has a probability p = 0.5 to close at every time step
before N2 .
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C Continuous Time Fictitious Play: the γ discounted case
Surprisingly, the analysis also holds in the γ-discounted case with again the same style of reasoning.
However, the distribution considered will be the γ-weighted occupancy measure instead of the
distribution over states. In this section, we reintroduce the notations and we prove similar continuous
time FP convergence results.
Consider given the following:
• a finite state space X (x ∈ X ),
• a finite action space A (a ∈ A),
• the set of distributions over state is ∆X (µ ∈ ∆X ),
• a reward function r(x, a, µ),
• the transition function p(x′|x, a),
• a policy: pi(a|x).
We will write:
• ppi(x′|x) = Ea∼pi(.|x)[p(x′|x, a)],
• rpi(x, µ) = Ea∼pi(.|x)[r(x, a, µ)],
The cumulative γ-discounted reward is defined as:
Jγ(x0, pi, µ) = E
[
+∞∑
n=0
γnr(xn, an, µ) | xn+1 ∼ p(.|xn, an), an ∼ pi(.|xn)
]
Useful properties: We have µpiγ (x′) = µ0(x′) + γ
∑
x∈X
ppi(x′|x)µpiγ (x) (in vectorial notations
µpiγ
> = µ>0 (I − γPpi)−1).
The γ-discounted reward can be written as: Jγ(x0, pi, µ) =
∑
x∈X
µpiγ (x)r
pi(x, µ)
We then have a similar formula for the policy generating the average distribution µ¯piγ (x, t) =
1
t
t∫
0
µpiγ (x, s)ds can be written p¯iγ(a|x, t) =
t∫
0
µpiγ (x,s)pi(a|x,s)ds
t∫
0
µpiγ (x,s)ds
Finally, we can write:
µ¯piγ (x, t)p¯iγ(a|x, t) =
1
t
t∫
0
µpiγ (x, s)pi(a|x, s)ds
And:
˙¯µpiγ (x, t)p¯iγ(a|x, t) + µ¯piγ (x, t) ˙¯piγ(a|x, t) =
1
t
[
µpiγ (x, t)pi(a|x, t)− µ¯piγ (x, t)p¯iγ(a|x, t)
]
. (6)
Fictitious Play in MFGs: In the γ-discounted case, Fictitious Play can be written as (for t ≥ 1):
µ˙(x, t) =
1
t
(µBRγ (x, t)− µ(x, t))
where µBRγ (x, t) is the distribution of a best response against µ(x, t) of policy pi
BR(a|x, t). In this
section, we will write pi(a|x, t) the policy of the distribution µ(x, t). From Eq.(6), we can deduce the
following property:
Property 3.
∀n, p˙i(a|x, t)µ(x, t) = 1
t
µBRγ (x, t)[pi
BR(a|x, t)− pi(a|x, t)]
Proof. Such representation directly follows from Eq.(6).
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We are now in position to turn to the Lyapounov congerging property of the Fictitious process.
Property 4. Under the monotony assumption, we can show that the exploitability (φ(t) =
max
pi′
Jγ(x0, pi
′, µpi)− Jγ(x0, pi, µpi)) is a strong Lyapunov function of the system:
φ˙(t) ≤ −1
t
φ(t)
Proof.
φ˙(t)
=
∑
x∈X
[ With∇µrpiBR (x,µ(t))=∇µr¯(x,µ(t)) and∇µrpi(x,µ(t))=∇µr¯(x,µ(t))︷ ︸︸ ︷
< ∇µrpiBR(x, µ(t)), µ˙(t) > µBRγ (x, t)− < ∇µrpi(x, µ(t)), µ˙(t) > µ(x, t)
− < p˙i(.|x, t), r(x, ., µ(t)) > µ(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− 1t rpiBR (x,µ(t))µBRγ (x,t)+ 1t rpi(x,µ(t))µBRγ (x,t)
−rpi(x, µ(t))µ˙(x, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1t r
pi(x,µ(t))µ(x,t)− 1t rpi(x,µ(t))µBRγ (x,t)
]
=
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µ(t))), µ˙(t) > [ 1
t
(µBRγ (x, t)− µ(x, t))]
]
+
∑
x∈X
[1
t
rpi(x, µ(t))µ(x, t)− 1
t
rpi
BR
(x, µ(t))µBRγ (x, t)
]
= −1
t
φ(t) +
∑
x∈X
[
t < ∇µr¯(x, µ(t))), µ˙(t) > µ˙(x, t))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 by monotony
≤ −1
t
φ(t)
Experiment: the Beach Bar Process with γ-discounted reward.
Environment: We implement the beach bar process in the γ-discounted setting.
Numerical results: We set γ = 0.9. The algorithm estimating the best response to a fixed distribution
µ is Policy Iteration in the case of the model based approach and Q-learning in the model-free. As
the flow of distributions converges towards the stationary distribution which is not time-dependant,
we only plot the final distribution obtained after 300 time steps (and not the evolution throughout time
as before). In particular, we notice that model-based and model-free approaches converge towards
the same distribution. We can also observe that the convergence rate of exploitability is O(1/t) for
the model-based and slower for the model-free approach.
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Policy Iteration
(a) Model-based
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0.008
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0.012
0.014
0.016 Q-learning
(b) Model-free
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100
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Figure 8: Final distributions and Exploitability in the γ-discounted case
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D Algorithm
Algorithm 2: Q-Learning in Mean Field Games
input :Start with a fixed distribution µ = and Qk = 0 and  and the learning rate α.
1 for k = 0, . . . ,K: do
2 sample xk0 ∼ µ0 ;
3 for n = 0, . . . , N : do
4 akn is -greedy with respect to Q
k(xkn, .).;
5 if not terminal sample xkn+1 according to p(.|xknakn).;
6 Qk+1n (x
k
n, a
k
n) = (1− α)Qk+1n (xkn, akn) + α[r(xkn, akn, µk−1) + maxbQkn+1(xkn+1, b)];
7 return pi∗ a greedy policy with respect to QK
Algorithm 3: Empirical Density Estimation
input :Start with a fixed policy pi and an initial distribution µ0 = µpi0
1 for k = 0, . . . ,K: do
2 sample xk0 ∼ µ0 ;
3 for n = 0, . . . , N : do
4 akn with respect to Q
k(xkn, .).;
5 if not terminal sample xkn+1 according to p(.|xknakn).
6 Finally ∀x, n ∈ X × {0, . . . , N} µˆpin(x) = 1K+1
∑K
k=0 1xkn=x;
7 return µˆpin
Algorithm 4: Backward Induction in Mean Field Games
input :Start with a fixed distribution µ = and a terminal Q-function QµN (x, a) = r(x, a, µN )
1 for k = N, . . . , 0: do
2 pi∗k is greedy with respect to Q
µ
k(x, a). ;
3 ∀a, x ∈ A× X Qµk−1(x, a) = r(x, a, µk−1) +
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a) max
b
Qµk(x
′, b) ;
4 return pi∗
Algorithm 5: Density Estimation
input :Start with a fixed policy pi and an initial distribution µ0 = µpi0
1 for k = N, . . . , 0: do
2 ∀x ∈ X µpik (x′) =
∑
x,a∈X×A
pik−1(a|x)p(x′|x, a)µpik−1(x) ;
3 return µpi
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E Linear Quadratic Model
E.1 Description
For the sake of completeness, we explain here how we obtained the benchmarck solution for the LQ
problem. The original model has been introduced in [36] and corresponds to the continuous time and
continuous spaces version of the LQ problem implemented in Section 4. Each agent can influence
their speed with a control denoted by αt. The dynamics of the agents is linear in their state, their
control and the mean position, denoted by m¯t. It is affected by an idiosyncratic source of randomness
W = (Wt)t≥0 as well as a common noise in the form of a Brownian motion W0 = (W 0t )t≥0. Given
a flow of conditional mean positions µ¯ = (µ¯t)t∈[0,T ] adapted to the filtration generated by W0, the
cost function of a representative player is defined as:
J(a; µ¯) = E
[∫ T
0
(
1
2
a2t − qat(µ¯t −Xt) +
κ
2
(µ¯t −Xt)2
)
dt+
cterm
2
(µ¯T −XT )2
]
Subject to the dynamics:
dXt = [K(µ¯t −Xt) + at]dt+ σ
(
ρ dW 0t +
√
1− ρ2dWt
)
.
At equilibrium, we must have µ¯t = E[Xt|(W 0s )s≤t] for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Here, ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant parameterizing the correlation between the noises, and q, κ, c, a, σ are
positive constants. We assume that q ≤ κ2 so that the running cost is jointly convex in the state and
the control variables.
The terms (µ¯t −Xt) in the dynamics and the cost function attract the process towards the mean µ¯t.
For the interpretation of this model in terms of systemic risk, the reader is referred to [36]. The model
is of linear-quadratic type and has an explicit solution through a Riccati equation, which we use as a
benchmark. The optimal control at time t is a linear combination of Xt and µ¯t, whose coefficients
depend on time. More precisely, it is given by:
at = (q + ηt)(µ¯t −Xt),
where η solves the following Riccati ODE:
η˙t = 2(a+ q)ηt + η
2
t − (κ− q2), ηT = cterm,
whose solution is explicitly given by:
ηt =
−(κ− q2)
(
e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − 1
)
− c
(
δ+e(δ
+−δ−)(T−t) − δ−
)
(
δ−e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − δ+)− c (e(δ+−δ−)(T−t) − 1)
where δ± = −(a+ q)±√R with R = (a+ q)2 + (κ− q2) > 0.
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F Common Success Metrics in Mean Field Games
The optimal value function satisfies the recursive equation:
V ∗,µN (x) = r(x, µN ), V
∗,µ
n−1(x) = maxa
{
r(x, a, µn−1) +
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a)V ∗,µn (x′)
}
.
In particular, by definition:
max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µpi) = Ex∼µ0 [V
∗,µpi
0 (x)]
And:
J(µ0, pi, µ
pi) = Ex∼µ0 [V
pi,µpi
0 (x)].
Let (x, µ) 7→ a∗(x, µ) be such that for every n and (reasonable?) µ:
V ∗,µn−1(x) = r(x, a
∗(x, µn−1), µn−1) +
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a∗(x, µn−1))V ∗,µn (x′), (7)
i.e. a∗ is an optimal control. Then, one way to check whether the value function we learned (e.g.
deduced from theQ-table) is a good approximate solution, is to compute the residual in the fixed point
equation (7). In other words, if the learned value function is V˜ and the policy is pi with associated
distribution µpi , then, we compute:
V˜n−1(x)−
[
r(x, a∗(x, µpin−1), µ
pi
n−1) +
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a∗(x, µpin−1))V˜n(x′)
]
for every n, x. Taking the norm over (n, x) ∈ {1, . . . , N} × X provides a metric to assess the
convergence of the value function.
Link with fixed-point iterations: One of the most basic methods to compute a MFG equilibrium is
to iteratively solve the forward equation for the distribution and the backward equation for the value
function. A typical stopping criterion is that the distribution and the value function do not change
too much between two successive iterations. We argue that this property implies an upper bound on
the exploitability. To be specific, say that at iteration k, given a value function Vk and its associated
optimal control pik, we compute the induced flow of distributions µk = µpik , and then we compute
the value function Vk+1 and the best response pik+1 of an infinitesimal player against this flow of
distributions. Note that:
max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µk) = max
pi′
J(µ0, pi
′, µpik) = J(µ0, pik+1, µpik) =
∑
x
Vk+1,0(x)µ0(x)
And:
J(µ0, pik, µk) =
∑
x
Vk,0(x)µ0(x).
Hence, if we know that ‖Vk+1 − Vk‖∞ := supx,n |Vk+1,n(x)Vk,n(x)| < , then, in particular,
|Vk+1,0(x)− Vk,0(x)| <  for all x and hence the exploitability is at most  too. Conversely, under
suitable regularity assumptions, we can expect that a small exploitability implies Vk+1 ≈ Vk not only
at time 0 but at every time.
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